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The Role of the Subconscious in
Intellectual Property Law
by ROBIN FELDMAN*
I. Introduction
Human behavior stems from a fascinating tangle of conscious
and subconscious impulses. While we are often quite aware of what
we are doing and how we have come to do it, such is not always the
case. Various human drives and instincts can lead us, for example, to
be perfectly convinced that our actions are appropriate or that our
motives are pure, despite considerable evidence to the contrary.
These issues become relevant in a variety of legal contexts, such
as when the law inquires into a person's state of mind. For example,
doctrines holding an individual liable for intentional behaviors, such
as intentional misrepresentation, would necessitate a particular level
of conscious awareness of one's actions.
Questions related to an individual's level of awareness also arise
in the structuring of doctrines outside of intent standards. In
choosing where to place a burden or whom to hold liable in a
particular setting, the law could choose to take account of the
direction that subconscious instincts may lead us. For example, one
might structure a doctrine to avoid constantly punishing people for
instincts they are unlikely to be able to avoid. In contrast, one might
structure a doctrine in a manner that holds people to a higher level of
duty of care, encouraging them to fight against a predictable
inclination to avoid that duty. In either case, the law would be taking
anticipated human frailties into account.
The human mind is particularly important in the realm of
intellectual property. The stuff of intellectual property, that which we
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choose to protect, flows from processes of the human mind as it
interacts with the natural world and with creations that have come
before.' When the creativity that leads to conception begins to flow,
human beings may not even be aware of what started the process or
what elements may have been considered or integrated into their own
creations. Without knowing any more than that, one might imagine
that subconscious processes of the human mind could come to play a
role in the unfolding doctrines.
This piece will consider how Intellectual Property law handles
subconscious impulses on the part of participants in the system.
Looking at examples from Copyright, Trade Secret, and Patent law,
the piece argues that although such impulses may be treated
differently in different areas of Intellectual Property law, the
variations can be understood in the context of the moral stance
adopted in the doctrinal area. Where the connection between the
moral stance of the doctrine and the approach taken by the doctrine
is muddled, it may signal a doctrine in disarray and suggest the need
for reformulation. Connecting this thread throughout the various
areas of Intellectual Property law may lead to more equitable and
effective doctrinal choices. At the very least, it has the virtue of
packaging the doctrinal choices in more palatable form for those who
inhabit the world of intellectual property rights.
Where discordance exists, one should not necessarily leap to any
conclusions about cause and effect. It is, of course, possible that the
discordance is not the cause of the problems in the area but merely a
symptom of the doctrinal disarray. Even from that perspective,
however, the discordance signals the need for a re-evaluation.
This piece by no means considers all occasions in which
Intellectual Property law encounters an issue potentially affected by
subconscious impulses. Rather, it is intended to suggest that we begin
explicitly examining Intellectual Property rules in light of an issue
that is currently hovering beneath the surface.
The piece begins by looking at Copyright law's doctrine of
subconscious copying, which holds individuals liable for their
subconscious use of knowledge. Consider the songwriter who sits
down in a jam session, composes a song, and is fully convinced that
the song is original. If the song is substantially similar to an earlier
1. See R. KEITH SAWYER, EXPLAINING CREATIVITY: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN
INNOvATION (2006) (presenting interdisciplinary research suggesting that the creative
spark usually occurs when human beings are looking upon inventions, tried and true, with
a new set of eyes).
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song that has been widely released, the songwriter will be liable for
copyright infringement.
The copyright approach stands in contrast to certain rules in
Trade Secret law. In particular, Trade Secret Law does not hold a
former employee liable for using general skills and experience
acquired on the job. The rule flows from the notion that an employee
would be hard pressed to forget the general skills and experience
learned at one job when the employee moves to another job.
Jettisoning that information would require, what one court has
described as "a prefrontal lobotomy." In recognition of this problem,
trade secret law defines "secret" to exclude general knowledge, skills,
and experience learned on the job. The rule implicitly recognizes the
difficulty of walling off certain information in one's mind. It does not
ask individuals to try to separate themselves from their knowledge
and does not hold them liable for impulses they are unlikely to be
able to control.
The two areas of law appear to be in contradiction. In one, the
law finds liability when the conscious mind fails to control
subconscious workings. In the other case, the law does not. Each,
however, is consistent with the relevant theoretical underpinnings. In
Trade Secret Law, the theoretical roots are based in tort with goals
that include the maintenance of commercial morality. Consistent
with this theoretical approach, misappropriation of a trade secret
generally requires some form of bad acts. Logically, the law should
not hold one responsible for bad acts if those acts consist of nothing
more than failure to control subconscious impulses that one is
unlikely to be able to avoid.
The relevant Copyright issue, however, is grounded in notions
other than bad acts. The inquiry in the case of subconscious copying
is simply whether the work is original to the songwriter. The law can
take account of the possibility that an individual may be unable to
exercise conscious control over use of subconscious instincts. Where
the question is the origin of the material, rather than the morality of
the act, liability can attach.
Although some doctrines within Patent law follow the same
logical path, that logic is missing in one key area, inequitable conduct.
Under the doctrine of inequitable conduct, patent applicants are
required to disclose all relevant art that they know of while the
application is pending. If a court finds that a patent holder failed to
provide material information to the Patent & Trademark Office in
any part of the application with the intent to deceive the examiner,
the entire patent is rendered unenforceable. Some cases have found
3
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intent when the court deemed the information highly material,
analogous to a "should have known" standard.
The inequitable conduct doctrine fails to take human frailties
into account. An ordinary inventor, fiercely proud of his or her
creation, and deeply convinced that it is an important advancement in
the art, may easily see contradictory material as irrelevant or
immaterial. Thus, Patent law expects human beings to scrutinize their
store of knowledge for any information that may go against their own
interests and to have the clarity of perception to recognize it as such.
When patent holders are unsuccessful in this process, the law finds
that they have engaged in bad, "inequitable" acts, despite the fact
that their behavior is psychologically predictable. In contrast to other
areas of Intellectual Property law, inequitable conduct doctrine loses
sight of the connection between basic human instincts and the moral
underpinnings of the doctrine.
II. Copying in Copyright Law
One of the fundamental conditions upon which protection arises
in copyright is originality. The Copyright Act provides that a
copyright interest attaches to such original works of authorship, so
long as they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression that allows
them to be perceived or communicated.' Once a copyright interest
attaches to a work, the author gains a variety of rights in his or her
creative work, and unauthorized acts become subject to infringement
liability.'
An infringement analysis requires proof that the defendant
copied protected elements of the copyrighted work.s If the defendant
2. "Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright
protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the
author." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (U.S. 1991).
3. Federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2009) ("[I]n original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.").
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2009); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2009) (providing that "[a]nyone who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106
through 122 ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author").
5. Federal Copyright Act § 102 ("[I]n original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.").
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has independently created the work, no liability will result.' Thus, in
theory, if an author is raised on a desert island, with no access to
media or any outside influences, and the author writes a novel
strikingly similar to, Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets, the
author has not engaged in copyright infringement-although if the
books are truly that similar, a court may be hard pressed to believe
the author did not sneak off the island and into a bookstore at some
point.
Copying may be proved with direct evidence, but many copyright
cases rely on circumstantial evidence suggesting that the defendant
had access to the copyrighted work and that the two works are
substantially similar.' The tests for establishing access and substantial
similarity may vary among courts.! Nevertheless, the tests are aimed
at determining whether the genesis of the defendant's work was his or
her own artistic talent, as opposed to the artistry of the protected
work.
Under the existing copyright regime, infringement is a matter of
strict liability-as long as a subsequent author or artist has infringed
upon the copyright holder's statutory rights, and such use is not
excused by the defenses provided in the Copyright Act, the intent of
the infringing party is irrelevant.' Strict liability for copyright
infringement can be traced to the very origin of copyright law itself.10
The British Statute of Anne, the progenitor of America's modern
copyright schema, granted strong intellectual property rights to the
creators of original works." The British courts applied the statute
with the view that a copyright interest was the equivalent of a
"trespass" on the property of the author in which the intent of the
6. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358. Copyright's originality requires "only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses some degree of creativity." Id. In contrast to patent and trademark law, which
directly prohibit the unauthorized use of intellectual property, the originality requirement
in copyright law prohibits the copying of the protected work. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2009)
(establishing the exclusive rights granted by a patent and the definition of infringement
thereof); 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2009) (defining infringement of the exclusive rights granted by
trademark).
7. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (stating that copying may
be proved by admission or by circumstantial evidence), cert. denied 330 U.S. 851 (1957).
8. Compare Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-469, with Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 n.7 (9th Cir. Cal. 1977).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 107-122, 501 (2009).
10. Dane S. Ciolino and Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright,
54 RUTGERS L. REv. 351, 365 (2002) (describing origin of strict liability).
11. Id.
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trespasser is not germane. 2 The Continental Congress, in drafting the
first federal copyright laws, adopted the theoretical foundation of the
British system." American courts have uniformly applied the
infringement-as-trespass analogy, consistently holding that a
copyright holder should benefit from any unauthorized use of his or
her property interest, without regard to the innocence of the
infringing party.
Copyright law contains the most explicit consideration of how
the law should handle the influence of the subconscious. Specifically,
the doctrine of subconscious copying allows for liability without
regard to the intent or knowledge of the defendant." A defendant
may be found to have copied, even if the defendant genuinely
believes that the accused work is original and has no conscious
awareness of copying.
The subconscious copying doctrine can be traced through a
handful of cases beginning with Judge Learned Hand's 1924 opinion
in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham." In Fred Fisher, an accomplished
composer of light operas was accused of infringing the copyright in a
piece called "Dardanella" by including its ostinato in his own
composition." An ostinato is a clearly defined melodic phrase that is
persistently repeated, usually in the same voice part and at the same
pitch."
While Judge Hand found no reason to doubt the defendant's
claim that he was not conscious of any plagiarism, the judge observed
that the similarity of the pieces, which were essentially identical,
could stem only from a subconscious copying of the work."
Observing that copyright provides an absolute right to prevent others
from copying an author's original collection of words or notes, and
12. Id.
13. Ciolino, supra note 10, at 355, 365-66 (tracing the roots of strict liability in
copyright law to the British Statute of Anne and Lockean philosophy).
14. See Ciolino, supra note 10.
15. See Joel S. Hollingsworth, Stop Me If I've Heard This Already: The Temporal
Remoteness Aspect of the Subconscious Copying Doctrine, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 457, 458 (2001) ("The subconscious copying doctrine states that copyright
infringement defendants can be held liable for infringement even if they sincerely believe
that they independently created their work.").
16. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (D.N.Y. 1924).
17. Id. at 147.
18. WILLi APEL & RALPH T. DANIEL, THE HARVARD BRIEF DICTIONARY OF
MUSIC 210-11 (Harvard University Press 1960).
19. 298 F. at 147.
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does not depend upon the infringer's good faith, Hand found that the
defendant had in fact infringed the "Dardanella" copyright,
notwithstanding his lack of intent to do so.20 Hand noted, in a clear
pronouncement of the doctrine, that "[o]nce it appears that another
has in fact used the copyright as the source of his production, he has
invaded the author's rights. It is no excuse that in doing so his
memory has played him a trick."21
The subconscious copying doctrine appears in a scattering of
additional cases.22 In Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v.
Boorman, the court, without citing the Fisher case, applied a virtually
identical analysis to find the defendant guilty of infringement.2 The
Edwards Court observed that "[i]f the thing covered by a copyright
has become familiar to the mind's eye, and one produces it from
memory and writes it down, he copies just the same."24
The same logic appeared in the Bright Tunes case, in which the
court applied the Fisher analysis to find liability regardless of intent.
In Bright Tunes, the copyright owners for the hit song "He's So Fine"
brought suit against George Harrison, formerly of The Beatles.25 The
suit alleged that Harrison had plagiarized the original track in the
course of composing his track "My Sweet Lord."26  Experts at trial
established that the musical composition of the two pieces were
20. Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 148.
21. Id.
22. Carissa L. Alden, A Proposal to Replace the Subconscious Copying Doctrine, 29
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1729, 1736 (2008) (finding that in the eighty years since Fred
Fischer, only three cases have been decided under the subconscious copying doctrine); but
see Hollingsworth, supra note 15, at 463-65 (claiming that Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp. represented an additional application of the subconscious copying
doctrine).
23. See Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir.
1926) (stating that "[it is not necessary, in order to hold against this contention, that
appellees swore falsely, or that they consciously followed appellant's work" and reversing
the finding of non-infringement, without citation to Fred Fisher); cf Fred Fisher, 298 F. at
148 (stating that "[o]nce it appears that another has in fact used the copyright as the
source of his production, he has invaded the author's rights. It is no excuse that in so doing
his memory has played him a trick" and thus establishing the subconscious copying
doctrine); see also Alden, supra note 22, at 1736 (naming Edwards as the first case after
Fred Fisher to apply the subconscious copying doctrine).
24. Edwards, 15 F.2d at 37.
25. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd, 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd sub nom. ABKCO Music Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.
1983).
26. Id. at 178.
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identical, satisfying the substantial similarity requirement.27 Other
evidence showed that Harrison had access to the original track owing
to its popularity-the song had enjoyed the No. 1 spot on the United
States Billboard charts for five weeks, and had been ranked on the
English charts contemporaneously with one of The Beatles' own hit
songs.5 The court noted that neither Harrison nor a collaborator on
the piece were conscious of the fact that they were utilizing the "He's
So Fine" theme. 29  Nevertheless, in accord with Hand's analysis in
Fisher," the court found that the composition was infringement, and
was no less so even though the copying was subconsciously
accomplished."
The most recent application of the doctrine by the court in Three
Boys Music Corporation v. Michael Bolton follows the same theme.32
The trial phase of the case commenced on February 24, 1992, when
the plaintiff copyright owner (Three Boys Music Corp.) filed suit
alleging that popular singer-songwriter Michael Bolton and Andrew
Goldmark had infringed on the copyright for a song recorded by the
Isley Brothers, "Love Is A Wonderful Thing," in the course of
recording his own song by the same title.33
Demonstrating the reach of the doctrine, the Three Boys
presented a far more attenuated case of subconscious copying than
Bright Tunes. In Bright Tunes, the original and infringing songs bore
a "striking" similarity, prompting the court to accept reduced
evidence of access to prove copying. The court concluded that
Harrison would have known about the original track as a professional
musician, given its popularity and ranking on the Billboard Top 100.35
In comparison, the Isley Brothers' "Love Is A Wonderful Thing" was
27. 420 F. Supp. at 181. Harrison himself admitted that the two tracks were
"substantially similar." Id. at 181 n.13.
28. Id. at 179.
29. Id. at 180.
30. While the Bright Tunes opinion does not reference Hand's opinion in Fred Fisher
Inc., they cite Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. for the proposition that
subconscious copying is infringement "and is no less so even though subconsciously
accomplished." Id. at 180.
31. Id. at 180.
32. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000).
33. Id. at 481.
34. Id. at 484 ("[T]his is a more attenuated case of reasonable access and
subconscious copying than ABKCO.").
35. 420 F. Supp. at 179.
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never widely played, and the two tracks were not so similar that
access could be presumed, as in Bright Tunes.36
Nevertheless, the jury found that Bolton had indeed infringed on
the original track, based on evidence and testimony that (1) Bolton
had been listening to "rhythm and blues music by black singers since
he was 10 or 11"; (2) radio and television stations operating where the
defendants grew up and lived had played the track; (3) Bolton had
been a "huge fan" of the Isley Brothers, and had told Isley's wife that
he "[knew] everything [Isley's] done"; and, perhaps most
incriminating, (4) Bolton had asked during recording if they were
copying a song by Marvin Gaye, another famous soul singer.' The
court affirmed the jury's verdict, observing that "it [was] entirely
plausible that two Connecticut teenagers obsessed with rhythm and
blues music could remember an Isley Brothers' song that was played
on the radio and television for a few weeks, and subconsciously copy
it twenty years later.""
The subconscious copying doctrine is vulnerable to a number of
criticisms.39 In particular, one could argue that the modern
incarnation sets the evidentiary bar far too low for the level of
exposure and the degree of similarity that permits a finding of lack of
originality. In fact, when the doctrine was first formulated, it was
applied under far more stringent circumstances.4
On the other hand, one could justify the doctrine on grounds of
economic theory or administrative efficiency. For example, one could
argue that potential infringers are better cost avoiders and thus, it is
more efficient to assign the cost of infringement to them.4 In
addition, from the perspective of administrative efficiency, the
defense, "I created it on my own," is easy to claim and difficult to
disprove. 42 The subconscious copying rule, therefore, reduces the
36. Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 484. Additionally, while the track was released as a
single, it was not released on an album until a year after Bolton authored his version. Id.
37. Id. at 483-84.
38. Id. at 484.
39. Ciolino, supra note 10, at 359-87 (discussing the justifications for and criticisms of
strict liability in copyright law).
40. Hollingsworth, supra note 15, at 474 (stating that "[w]hen the doctrine was first
formulated, it "applied under stringent circumstances, i.e. where there was a low degree of
temporal remoteness and under a strong showing of copying").
41. Ciolino, supra note 10, at 376.
42. See Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 148; see also Ciolino, supra note 11, at 386-87
(discussing administrative efficiency of strict liability).
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number of circumstances in which accused infringers will raise
baseless defenses.
Nevertheless, I am interested in the subconscious copying
doctrine for a different purpose. The doctrine is a wonderful example
of how the law grapples with the subconscious workings of the human
mind as it processes knowledge. In particular, the doctrine
acknowledges the potential for subconscious workings and handles
the implications in a way that is consistent with the doctrine's moral
stance.
The legal question for copyright infringement concerns the
originality of the creation. It is not framed in terms of the bad
behavior of actors in the system or in terms of equities, but rather in
terms of divvying up property ownership in a manner that promotes
progress.
Thus, in contrast to some of the Intellectual Property doctrines
described below, originality is not presented as a judgment of amoral
behavior. Instead it is framed as a judicial pronouncement of proper
accreditation. In this context, ignoring subconscious impulses
presents no problem. If the law is not suggesting bad behavior on the
part of a subsequent creator, there is no need to make allowance for
understandable human impulses.
One could argue that copyright law ought to adopt a different
moral stance. Perhaps copyright law should be reformulated to look
more closely at the equities, denying liability in the case of reasonable
behavior by an infringer or reprehensible behavior by a copyright
holder. One could also quite plausibly argue that there is a certain
circularity in the notion that the innocence of the infringer is
irrelevant because originality is not a question of bad behavior.
Perhaps the entire theoretical grounding of the area is driven by a
motivation to avoid having to apply equities. In other words, the
overarching moral stance is motivated by a desire to achieve a
particular result. From this perspective, it is choice to avoid certain
outcomes that come first. The justification wraps itself around after
that point. Nevertheless, one cannot help but note the coherence
between the moral stance and the handling of human impulses-a
coherence that will be lacking in some areas of Intellectual Property
law.
III. Human Skills and Experience in Trade Secret Law
Trade Secret law evidences a similar coherence between the
moral stance of the theory and the treatment of the subconscious,
[Vol. 2:1
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although the results look quite different. Unlike Copyright, Trade
Secret's roots are firmly embedded in tort-like notions of equity and
improper behavior. A finding of misappropriation of a trade secret
normally requires a finding of bad acts on the part of the accused. In
addition, the goals of Trade Secret law include the maintenance of
commercial morality,4 3 although one could argue endlessly about the
meaning and appropriateness of such a phrase.
In contrast to Copyright and Patent law, Trade Secret is
primarily governed by state law, which makes it subject to
considerable variations across jurisdictions. At least 46 states have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), although not all
in precisely the same form. Other states rely on the old Second
Restatement of Torts, while still others incorporate elements evident
in the Restatement Third of Unfair Competition.
Despite these variations, certain core principles are evident.
Trade Secret protects valuable business information that is unknown
or not reasonably ascertainable by competitors, and that provides a
competitive advantage to those who possess it. As a general matter,
misappropriation of a trade secret requires three elements: (1) a
valuable business secret; (2) improper acts; and (3) reasonable efforts
by the trade secret holder to maintain secrecy.
Trade Secret has bifurcated roots, including property-like
notions related to promoting innovation in business competition, tort-
like notions related to reasonable business behavior, and contract
notions related to relationships among parties in business. Trade
Secret's moral stance is evident in the requirement that an accused
party have engaged in improper conduct. Thus, Trade Secret law
explicitly considers the reasonableness of behavior on the part of the
person accused of misappropriation.
Questions related to subconscious use of knowledge appear
beneath the surface of several Trade Secret doctrines. The first
concerns the general skills and experience that an employee gains
while working on the job. The experience of working at any job for a
period of time will bring a wealth of general skills, knowledge, and
experience to an employee. A worker could not be expected to
excise that information from his or brain, somehow wiping the slate
clean of the information he or she has learned. For example, an
employee certainly would not be expected to forget what works well
43. See, e.g., MELVIN F. JAGER, 1982 TRADE SECRETS LAW HANDBOOK §§ 1.01-1.02
(1982).
44. See, e.g., Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 849 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1988).
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in a sales pitch, or return to the rookie mistakes the worker may have
stumbled into when first on the job. It would be unrealistic, and
perhaps impossible, to expect an employee to wall off such
information. In addition, courts have found the category of general
skills and experience to include information about individual
customers, the identity of their buyers, and their buying preferences.
Consider the case of Fleming Sales v. Bailey." In Fleming, the
plaintiff owned a business that manufactured recreational vehicle
component parts, and the defendant was a former general manager
employed by the plaintiff.6 Fleming alleged that the employee had
misappropriated trade secrets, including the names of and detailed
information about the employer's customers." He alleged that
defendant also knew whom to contact in customer departments, what
the customers' prior purchasing and payment histories were, and what
their projected needs and methods of buying were.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the employee
on grounds including that the information was general knowledge
that the employee was permitted to make use of on his next job.
"Any other rule would force a departing employee to perform a
prefrontal lobotomy on himself or herself."
Thus, trade secret law implicitly recognizes limitations on
conscious control of the mind's machinations. It would be unrealistic
to expect an employee to avoid using such information, and Trade
Secret law does not demand unrealistic behavior. Rather, Trade
Secret law resolves the problem by classifying such information as
something that is not protectable. The approach is consistent with the
moral stance of the doctrine. Give that Trade Secret is directed at
bad acts and improper behavior, it would be perverse to hold
employees liable for behavior they are unlikely to be able to avoid.
The question of subconscious control of knowledge appears with
an interesting twist in another area of Trade Secret law, the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. Under this doctrine, a company can prevent a
former employee from working for a direct competitor for a period of
time in the interests of protecting the company's trade secrets.
45. Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
46. Id. at 508.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 509.
49. Id. at 506.
[Vol. 2:1
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The classic inevitable disclosure case is PepsiCo v. Redmond."o In
PepsiCo, Pepsi sued to enjoin a former general manager from
accepting employment with Quaker, the maker of the competing
beverage, Gatorade. Pepsi argued that the employee had virtually
memorized information about Pepsi's pricing architecture and attack
plans. The employee would unintentionally disclose the information
because it was central to his new job at Quaker."
The Court reasoned that inevitable disclosure was likely to occur
even assuming the employee acted in good faith. His intent to
maintain confidentiality would not guarantee protection of the trade
secrets because it is impossible to "wipe clean" a person's memory.
The potential for either a good-faith or bad-faith disclosure made
disclosure inevitable, and thus justified barring the employee from
engaging in his livelihood for a period of time.
The inevitable disclosure doctrine acknowledges the limitations
of conscious control, but in a paternalistic fashion. The law simply
prevents the employee from entering what it perceives as a
psychologically challenging position.
At first glance, the result of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
appears at odds with Trade Secret's approach to general skills and
experience. With general skills and knowledge, the law recognizes
the difficulty of limiting the subconscious, declaring the information
beyond the bounds of trade secret law and giving the employee free
reign to use the information in a new job. With inevitable disclosure,
the law also recognizes the difficulty of limiting the subconscious, but
this time, it drastically limits the employee's freedom, restricting the
employee from taking a related job."
One could argue, however, that the two doctrines are not as
starkly at odds as they may appear. In both settings, the law
recognizes the difficulty of eliminating subconscious instincts and
keeps employees from being in a position in which perfectly human
and understandable behavior would leave them vulnerable to a
charge of bad conduct.
50. PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1263 (7th Cir. 1995).
51. Id. at 1265.
52. Id. at 1267, 1271.
53. Of course, the information and its time sensitivity are not of the same caliber in
the two circumstances. An inevitable disclosure injunction applies in the case of highly
strategic information whose impact may be controlled through an injunction for a limited
period of time. Asking an employee to forget general skills and experience would require
a lifetime injunction.
13
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The fact that individuals may be subject to subconscious instincts
does not require that the law immunize any resulting behavior. It
simply requires that the law take account of the existence of the
subconscious pull in crafting a doctrinal response. Most important, it
suggests the need for coherence between those instincts, the moral
stance of the doctrine, and the doctrinal rules.
IV. Inequitable Conduct in Patent
Patent law is explicitly utilitarian. The goal is to promote the
progress of the useful arts by creating incentives for innovation." In
this quest, Patent law grants rights to the first to invent a new and
useful product or process that would not merely be obvious to those
skilled in the art. The inventor is granted rights to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the invention for a finite period in
exchange for revealing the invention, which becomes part of the
public domain upon the expiration of his patent.
In contrast to Trade Secret, the core concepts of Patent law have
no tort-like overtones of commercial morality or bad behavior. The
philosophical roots of Patent law lie in trespass on the property rights
obtained through the grant of a patent from the federal government.
Consistent with this orientation, infringement analysis in Patent
law is a matter of strict liability. Liability will attach to use of a
patented invention regardless of whether that use is in good faith or
perfectly innocent.
The question of moral blame appears most prominently in Patent
law in the context of the inequitable conduct doctrine. In reductionist
form, those who seek a patent are required to disclose all information
they are aware of in the prior art that casts doubt on the patentability
of their invention. Such doubt could relate to whether the invention
already exists in the art, whether it would be obvious to those in the
art, whether a particular claim is too broad, or whether a claims is not
properly enabled.
Inventors who have failed to appropriately disclose such
information during the patent application process can be found to
have engaged in inequitable conduct. The issue generally arises when
a patent holder attempts to enforce the patent and accused infringers
raise inequitable conduct as a defense. Prior art submissions and
arguments related to patentablility are part of the patent application's
54. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. ("Congress shall have the power to ... promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts by securing to securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
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record, which becomes publicly available when the patent is
published. If a patent holder is found to have engaged in inequitable
conduct in any part of the patent application process in relation to
any claim, the patent becomes unenforceable.
Deciding what information to disclose is a treacherous business
for inventors and their representatives. Lest patent holders be
tempted to bombard the Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") with
everything under the sun, excessive disclosure subjects patent
attorneys to discipline for breach of ethics."
The nature of conception itself makes it difficult for inventors
and representatives to clearly interpret all information in the art that
might cut against their claim of inventorship. Excited inventors,
mentally invested in the triumph of their innovation may be inclined
to view contradictory suggestions as irrelevant or unimportant.
Such understandable human instincts provide little comfort in
the face of a charge of inequitable conduct. Under modern law, the
standards for finding inequitable conduct are so loose and so unclear
that understandable human conduct can easily be swept into the
category of reprehensible behavior punishable by the complete loss of
patent rights.
Inequitable conduct in Patent law is a judicially created doctrine.
It has evolved through a series of Supreme Court decisions dating
back to the 1930s that likened the misconduct of a patentee to fraud.
The defense was premised upon the Doctrine of Unclean Hands with
the theory being that a patent holder who has been devious in
misleading the patent office during prosecution should not be entitled
to enforce the patent."
The judicial doctrine flows from a duty of candor, currently
embodied in C.F.R. § 1.56 (PTO Rule 56). Under the rule, patent
applicants have a duty to disclose all Prior Art that is materially
relevant to their invention of which the applicant is aware. All
participants, including inventors, attorneys, agents, and all others,
who reasonably contributed to the invention or to prosecution, are
bound by this duty.'
55. See PTO Discipline Director Harry Moatz Presentation, (presentation by the
Director of PTO's Office of Enrollment and Discipline cautioning attorneys that those
who submit massive amounts of information within their disclosure may be subject to
discipline for a breach of ethics under 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)).
56. See, e.g., Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the 'Plague'. Reforming the Doctrine
of Inequitable Conduct, BERKLEY TECH. L.J., (forthcoming 2009).
57. 37 C.F.R. §1.56.
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A finding of inequitable conduct rests on two elements: Intent of
the patentee to mislead the PTO and Materiality of the information
that was omitted or misstated. The party asserting inequitable
conduct must prove a threshold level of materiality and intent by
clear and convincing evidence." After courts determine that the
threshold levels of both Materiality and Intent are satisfied, they
perform a balancing step to determine whether the patentee was
guilty of inequitable conduct. When balancing, "a greater showing of
one factor, allow[s] a lesser showing of the other.""
There has been considerable tension across time between courts
and the PTO over attempts to define what information PTO
examiners would find material. The Federal Circuit has politely
reserved the right to determine that definition itself.
The Doctrine has been subject to much criticism over the last 20
years, beginning with the comments of a Federal Circuit Judge in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp. who noted the following:
[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every
major patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable
lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against
other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent
their client's interests adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere
with the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases, but
such charges are not inconsequential on that account. They
destroy the respect for one another's integrity .... A patent
litigant should be made to feel, therefore, that an unsupported
charge of 'inequitable conduct in the Patent Office' is a negative
contribution to the rightful administration of justice.0
Some recent jurists have been even more blunt. A vocal critic of
the inequitable conduct doctrine noted the following in dissenting to a
2003 Federal Circuit decision: "This case illustrates the ease of
opportunistic challenge to the conduct of experimental science in
patent context. My colleagues have distorted the patent process, and
58. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
59. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
60. See, Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
see also Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1, 4, on file
with author).
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the science it supports, into a game of high stakes hindsight that few
patents can survive."
Not only has overuse of the doctrine been a problem, courts also
have faced serious difficulties in establishing the standards for both
materiality and intent. With materiality, courts at various times have
struggled to decipher what information the PTO would have
considered important during prosecution. Adding to the problem,
even after the PTO attempted to clarify the standard for materiality,"
the Federal Circuit took the PTO's rule making as only a suggestion,
and added the PTO's rule to the list that could be considered for
measuring materiality." At the moment, the Federal Circuit appears
to be somewhat at rest, having returned to an older "reasonable
patent examiner" standard, in which information is material if there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable patent examiner would
consider it important in deciding whether to issue a patent.6 4  Of
course, such an inquiry is subject to the distortions of hindsight. Once
information becomes relevant as prior art during litigation it has a
tendency to seem obviously material.
While the materiality standard has been challenging, the intent
standard has been even more difficult to pin down. In addition, the
relationship between the two standards has become important in
recent years as the courts increasingly use the level of materiality to
infer intent." As one dissenting judge lamented in 2008, the decision
61. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J. dissenting); see also Mammen, supra note 60 (manuscript at 1, 6) (describing
the case).
62. The PTO adopted 37 CFR §1.56 in 1977 which created the duty to disclose
material information, defined as: "Information is material where there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to
allow the application to issue as a patent. The duty is commensurate with the degree of
involvement in the preparation or prosecution of the application."
63. In 1992, the PTO revised 37 CFR §1.56 to reflect a more objective standard,
defining material information as information that "establishes, by itself or in combination
with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or ... refutes, or is
inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in . . . folpposing an argument of
unpatentability relied on by the Office, or ... [a]sserting an argument of patentability. 37
C.F.R. §1.56(b) (1992). However, the Federal Circuit in Digital Control cited the statutory
history of the 1992 revision to find that the PTO did not intend for the revised Rule 56 to
replace the reasonable patent examiner standard. Digital Control v. Charles Mach.
Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
64. Mammen, supra note 60 (manuscript at 7); see also Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at
1367.
65. See Larson Mfg. Co. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., No. 2008-1096, slip op. at 4 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 18, 2009) (Lin, J., concurring) (citing Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l Inc., 839
F.2d 1556, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (noting the proposition that "materiality does not
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seems to conflate materiality with intent, allowing the court to reach a
finding of intent without citing any actual evidence of intent.6
Modern struggles to rein in the reach of the intent standard can
be traced to the Burlington case in 1988. In Burlington, an attorney
used one term synonymously with another in a way that could be read
as a misinterpretation. Expressing great concern over the plethora of
inequitable conduct charges in patent cases, the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's finding of inequitable conduct. The
appellate court concluded that the district court had erred in rejecting
the patent attorney's plausible explanation for his interchangeable
use of phrases, in favor of something more "sinister," to find intent."
Shortly after Burlington, the Federal Circuit sitting en banc
reversed a summary judgment finding of inequitable conduct in the
Kingsdown case. The lower court's finding had been based solely
upon an attorney's accidental filing of a pre-amended patent claim
instead of the amended version during the course of a continuation
application. The Federal Circuit noted that it would have been easy
for the patent holder to make an innocent error given such factors as
the similarity in language of the two claims, the use of the same claim
number for both applications, the numerous claims involved in the
prosecution of both applications; and the two-year interval between
the rejection and the filing of the continuation."
Prior to Kingsdown, some Federal Circuit panels had found
intent to deceive based on gross negligence, which in turn could arise
from a finding that the patentee failed to disclose information that the
patentee "should have known" was material. The en banc
Kingsdown, opinion established that "'gross negligence' does not of
itself justify an inference of intent to deceive."7 2 Thus, the Kingdown
decision repudiated the practice of finding intent to deceive based on
gross negligence, and by implication, the "should have known" test.73
presume intent, which is a separate and essential component of inequitable conduct," and
arguing that current case law improperly mixes the two).
66. See Praxair, Inc. v, ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Lourie, J.
dissenting).
67. See Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1421.
68. See id. at 1421.
69. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 873 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
70. See id. at 873.
71. See Mammen, supra note 60 (manuscript at 10-11).
72. See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 872, 876.
73. See id. at 876.
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Both Burlington and Kingsdown were in line with the Supreme
Court decisions from which the inequitable conduct doctrine
originally emerged. The Supreme Court's three inequitable conduct
cases all involved overt fraud by the patent applicant, as opposed to
what may have amounted to no more than acts of error or omission.74
Despite the en banc ruling in Kingsdown that gross negligence
does not justify an inference of intent, a Federal Circuit panel drifted
away from that ruling in 2001." The opinion opened the way for
much more far-reaching inferences about intent, holding that gross
negligence in avoiding learning of the materiality of information
would support a finding that the applicant should have known of its
materiality. According to the panel, the finding of gross negligence
was sufficient to support a conclusion that the applicant satisfied the
threshold requirement of intent.6 The court differentiated its holding
from Kingsdown by explaining that the "should have known"
standard would not support gross negligence, and thus could not lead
to a finding of intent, but a finding of gross negligence could support
the applicant satisfying the "should have known" materiality standard
and could lead to a finding of intent.77  This is a remarkably
challenging difference to parse out.
In the following years, the cases have veered is different
directions as the Federal Circuit has tried to find its bearings. In the
second week of February 2006, a Federal Circuit panel decided
Digital Control, following the Kingsdown approach for analyzing
intent, and reversing a lower court finding of intent based on gross
negligence.6 The next week, a different Federal Circuit panel
decided Ferring, finding intent based on what the applicant "should
have known," without mentioning gross negligence." The Ferring
opinion effectively restored the "should have known" standard while
74. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
809, 819 (1945); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 243 (1933);
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240, 243 (1944). See also,
Aluminart Prods., 559 F.3d at 1342 (Lin, J., concurring)
75. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I., L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
76. See id. at 1380.
77. See id.; see also Mammen, supra note 60 (manuscript at 11-12) (discussing the fact
that the Brassler case marked a shift in the intent prong of the inequitable conduct
doctrine).
78. Mammen, supra note 60 (manuscript at 41).
79. Digital Control, 437 F.3d 1309.
80. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 549 U.S. 1015 (2006).
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nominally complying with Kingsdown's direction against using gross
negligence to find intent.
In 2008, a Federal Circuit panel again attempted to rein in the
doctrine in a decision in the Star Scientific case." In Star Scientific,
the Court held that "the inference [of intent to deceive] must not only
be based on sufficient evidence and be reasonable in light of that
evidence, but it must also be the single most reasonable inference
able to be drawn from the evidence."" If other reasonable inferences
can be drawn, for example that the patentee had an incorrect belief
concerning the materiality of information, a conclusion of deceptive
intent should not be automatically inferred."
Any relief from the inequitable conduct doctrine, however,
evaporated quickly. In the Praxair case, decided just over a month
later, the Court returned to the test in Ferring based on the old
"should have known" standard." In yet another shift of the winds,
cases after Praxair suggest that at least some Federal Circuit judges
are frustrated with the reach state of the doctrine."
The facts of a number of these cases demonstrate how loosely an
inference of intent may be drawn. Consider the Ferring case. During
the application process in Ferring, the inventors were asked to submit
declarations from "non-inventors" concerning how those skilled in
the art would interpret a particular term. The inventors failed to
disclose that some of the scientists submitting declarations at various
points had had business or research relationships with the exclusive
licensee of the technology, for whom the inventors had worked. The
Federal Circuit panel upheld a finding that although the inventors
were foreigners, they should have known that the request for non-
81. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 1366.
83. See id.
84. See Larson, No. 2008-1096, slip op. at 3 (Lin, J., concurring) (discussing the line of
cases); see also Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying
the three-prong test in Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d at 1191, in which
deceptive intent can be inferred when "(1) highly material information is withheld; (2) 'the
applicant knew of the information [and] ... knew or should have known of the materiality
of the information; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible explanation for the
withholding"').
85. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting); Larson, No. 2008-1096 (Lin, J., concurring); see also
Dickson Indus., Inc. v. Patent Enforcement Team, L.L.C., 333 Fed.Appx. 514 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (striking down a finding of inequitable conduct on the grounds that the patent
holder was denied the opportunity to present evidence of good faith).
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inventor declarations also meant people unaffiliated at any time and
in any way.
I do not mean to suggest that the inventors were correct in failing
to investigate and disclose the relationships, but the failure to do so
seems a stretch as evidence of intent to mislead the patent office. It
also seems to stretch the notion of the type of behavior that one
would brand as so nefarious and fraudulent that it should be
considered punishable by the loss of the patent rights. The behavior
seems more closely aligned with understandable human error as
inventors scramble among the names of people they know in a small,
related field to find those who might be able to comment on the
meaning of a technical term.
One might also look at the facts of the 2003 Hoffmann-La Roche
case.86 Hoffman-La Roche concerned interpretation of certain tests
that could have had a bearing on whether the enzyme created can be
properly distinguished from enzymes in the prior art.' The dispute
involved the definition of units of activity in the tests and the
possibility of differences in purity." In upholding a finding of
inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit noted the lower court's
finding that the inventors had a good faith belief they had discovered
an enzyme different from what was described in the prior art.89 The
Federal Circuit noted, however, that, "[t]he inventors may indeed
have believed they had discovered a novel enzyme, but that belief
does not permit them to make misrepresentations in seeking to
persuade the examiner to issue a patent for that enzyme.""
The Federal Circuit's observation brushes against the problem in
this doctrinal area. Inventors who are honestly convinced of the
novelty of their inventions may easily fail to focus on evidence to the
contrary or may interpret such evidence as unimportant or redundant.
This, however, may be the result of the pull of one's perspective,
rather than an intent to deceive. Branding such human instincts as
"bad acts" is particularly troubling when the supposed errors or
omissions are being culled from numerous actions, that are subjected
to the microscope of litigation and judged in hindsight.
One could argue against the current manifestation of the
inequitable conduct doctrine on many levels. The threshold level at
86. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1364-1366.
89. Id. at 1371.
90. Id. at 1367.
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which one can infer intent to deceive seems to be set perilously low.
It allows an inference of deceptive intent from relatively minor
behavior. It also makes that judgment with little awareness of the
potential for hindsight bias. In addition, even if the bar is set at an
appropriate level, it is impossible to tell precisely what that level is in
view of the confusion in the case law, and even more difficult to
predict what the results of a particular case will be.
The inequitable conduct doctrine, however, is flawed on a much
more fundamental level. The doctrine asks inventors to identify all
knowledge of which they are aware, determine which information
might be against their interests, and highlight it as such. An ordinary
mortal, proud of his invention and emotionally invested in the notion
of its advancement over the current art may all too easily read
contradictory material as irrelevant, unimportant, or redundant of
information already disclosed. The doctrine requires inventors to act
against their own interests and in a manner that contradicts their
instincts, and then charges them with immoral behavior for an
inability to consciously override those instincts.
Of course, we ask criminal prosecutors to act in a similar manner,
requiring them to turn over all potentially exculpatory information to
the accused. Leaving aside the obvious differences in the stakes and
responsibility of government actors, the nature of the information in
Patent law is quite different from the nature of information in
criminal prosecution. Information in a criminal case is bounded.
Although the edges of the boundary may be unclear, there is a limited
amount of information available in any given case. In contrast, an
inventor must consider all possible knowledge that he or she might be
credited with having. This could include every conference, every
experiment performed, and every paper read in related fields that
might, in hindsight, be considered material.
In addition, criminal prosecutors do not labor under an ethical
constraint against producing too much information, as patent lawyers
do." Most important, the information in a patent case is quite
complex. The question of whether a particular experiment or paper
might suggest that a claim is drawn improperly against the prior art,
for example, can be difficult to determine. These factors make the
duty of candor in Patent law quite different from the duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence in Criminal law.
91. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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In short, with the inequitable conduct doctrine, there is a tension
between the moral stance of the doctrine, an inventor's
understandable human instincts, and the rules chosen. The doctrine
ignores subconscious instincts in the processing of information,
finding improper behavior in what is no more than what can be
expected from the human mind. Whether a cause or an effect of the
disarray in the area, the discordance signals the need for a re-
formulation.
A variety of solutions exist, and this piece is not intended to
explore any or all of them in depth. Nevertheless, the simplest
solution would be shifting the inequitable conduct doctrine to a rule
that punishes only active fraud. Such an approach would end the
dissonant and itself inequitable effect of a doctrine that risks
punishing subconscious human instincts as immoral behavior.
To the extent that the duty of candor is intended to help
determine objective patentability issues, the duty delegates that role
to the party with a significant psychological handicap. Although
inventors can certainly hire expert agents, such as lawyers and patent
prosecutors, to help mitigate the problem, doing so provides only
limited protection against the subconscious instinct to view the case as
one would wish it could be. Such experts receive their information
from the inventors, particularly information about what is known
about the prior art. In addition, even experts such as lawyers are
known to fall prey to the error of seeing a case too strongly from their
client's perspective. Thus, part of the doctrine's problem may be that
it tries to do too much at once, both asking the patent applicant to be
candid about his or her own knowledge and expecting that inquiry to
produce too much of the information about prior art. Perhaps the
burden of providing extensive prior art information rests too heavily
on the shoulders of the patent applicant, who is not in the best
position psychologically to bear that burden. The solution to that
problem is not to make the patent applicant more and more
responsible for that burden by increasing the range of issues that the
applicant will be held to have known about. Rather, the solution may
lie in finding others in the system who are better situated to provide
that perspective, either by allowing earlier intervention from
adversaries or beefing up the resources of the administrative experts.
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V. Conclusion
The nature of intellectual property itself is dependent upon
human cognitive processes, and rights are bestowed for mentally
derived assets. With this in mind, the law must consider the
possibility the creative minds within the intellectual property system
may work in ways that the creator is unaware of. The challenge in
those doctrinal areas is to recognize and grapple with our all too
human tendencies. The doctrinal areas are more likely to be
equitable and effective when the moral stance of the doctrine is
consistent with our understanding of both conscious and subconscious
impulses.
